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FORUM SHOPPING IN PATENT CASES: DOES
GEOGRAPHIC CHOICE AFFECT
INNOVATION?
KIMBERLY A. MooRE*
This Article undertakes the first large-scale empirical analysis of
patent enforcement in the district courts. The Article is organized
around four major questions. What motivates parties to forum
shop? Can variationin patent case resolution amongjurisdictions
be substantiated? Are jurisdictional variation and the resulting
forum shopping good or efficient? Can forum shopping be
reduced or eliminated?
The empirical results demonstrate that despite the creation of the
FederalCircuit, choice offorum continues to play a criticalrole in
the outcome of patent litigation. The data indicate that patent
cases are not evenly dispersed throughout the ninety-four judicial
districts or dispersed according to the relative size of the court's
civil docket generally, but rather consolidated in a few select
jurisdictions. The ten most frequently selected forums are
examined in detail in an attempt to ascertain their appeal for
patent holders. Noting procedural and substantive differences in
adjudication of patent cases by these top ten jurisdictions, the
Article determines that choice of forum is a multi-dimensional
inquiry which is not easily explained.
The lack of uniformity in patent enforcement is problematic. With
increasingly national competition among products, the patent
jurisdictionand venue statutes allow plaintiffs to bring theirpatent
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suits in virtually any district in the country. Providingplaintiffs
with many potential venues for bringing suit increases the ability
of parties to forum shop. The Article concludes by considering
whether the patent system might benefit from the increased
predictabilitythat could be achieved by a specialized trialcourt or
a more limited venue statute.
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"Click your heels together three times and say, 'There's no place
like home, there's no place like home.' "1
INTRODUCTION

Despite the overwhelming costs of patent litigation,2 no recent
research analyzing regional variation in the adjudication of patent
cases exists.3 The dearth of work in this area may be attributable to

an assumption that the Federal Circuit is a panacea for regional

variation in patent case resolution.4 This assumption, however, is

incorrect in a judicial system in which ninety-four district courts5 with

1. THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939).
2. See AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF
ECONOMIC SURVEY 1999, at 72 (noting that an average patent infringement suit in
California, for example, will cost each party over two million dollars in litigation
expenses).
3. Two pre-Federal Circuit empirical studies verified the existence of appellate
variation in patent case adjudication. See generally GLORIA K. KOENIG, PATENT
INVALIDITY: A STATISTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS (1980) (providing systematic
analysis of the details in patent decisions and patent office prosecution data); P.J.
Federico, Adjudicated Patents,1948-54,38 J.P.O.S. 233 (1956) (providing statistical report
of the number of adjudicated patents and the results of the adjudications from 1948-1954
using a database limited to published opinions).
4. E.g., Andrea Gerlin, Patent Lawyers ForgoSure Fees on a Bet, WALL ST. J., June
24, 1994, at B1 (stating that the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive nationwide
jurisdiction over all appeals from patent infringement suits, "wiped out all the screwy
theories and forum shopping"); see also C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874, 878
(Fed. Cir. 1983) ("This court was formed to provide uniformity in the patent field and to
prevent forum shopping."). The Federal Circuit was created in 1982 in order to make
patent law and its enforcement uniform and consistent. In its report on the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982, which created the Federal Circuit, the House stated:
Patent litigation long has been identified as a problem area, characterized by
undue forum-shopping and unsettling inconsistency in adjudications. Based on
the evidence it compiled during the course of thorough hearings on the subject,
the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System-created by
Act of Congress-concluded that patent law is an area in which the application
of the law to the facts of a case often produces different outcomes in different
courtrooms in substantially similar cases. As a result, some circuit courts are
regarded as "pro-patent" and other "anti-patent," and much time and money is
expended in "shopping" for a favorable venue. In a Commission survey of
practitioners, the patent bar reported that uncertainty created by the lack of
national law precedent was a significant problem; the Commission found patent
law to be an area in which widespread forum-shopping was particularly acute.
H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 20-21 (1981) (footnotes omitted), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 30-31; see also S. REP. No. 97-275, at 5 (1981), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15 (stating that "[t]he establishment of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit also provides a forum that will increase doctrinal stability in the field of
patent law").
5. See Federal Judiciary, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.uscourts.govl
faq.html#district (last visited April 15,2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(indicating that there are ninety-four district courts).
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646 active federal judges6 around the country resolve patent cases in
the first instance.
This Article undertakes the first large-scale empirical analysis of
patent enforcement in the district courts after the creation of the
Federal Circuit. My database includes every patent case that was
terminated by any means (e.g., settlement, dismissal, judgment) from
1995 to 1999 (five years of data) in every district court (9615 cases)
and every patent case that went to trial (1409 cases with 1943 separate
claims) from the period 1983 to 1999 (seventeen years of data).
The empirical results presented in this Article demonstrate that
despite the creation of the Federal Circuit, choice of forum continues
to play a critical role in the outcome of patent litigation. The data
indicate that patent cases are not dispersed evenly throughout the
ninety-four judicial districts nor dispersed according to the relative
size of the court's civil docket generally, but rather consolidated in a
few select jurisdictions. This suggests that patent holders are actively
selecting particular forums. The empirical results substantiate
procedural and substantive differences in district court adjudication
of patent cases. The differing procedures for resolving patent cases
and differing potential outcomes create an environment in which
forum shopping has a major impact on litigation.7
The lack of uniformity in patent enforcement is problematic in
and of itself. The concern this inconsistency generates is greatly
magnified when the patent holder has unfettered choice among the
ninety-four
district
courts-escalating
inconsistency
into
unpredictability.
With increasingly national and international
competition among products, the patent jurisdiction and venue
statutes allow plaintiffs to bring their patent suits in virtually any
district in the country. Providing plaintiffs with so many potential
venues for bringing suit increases the ability of parties to forum shop.
Much effort and expense result from the ability of parties to forum
shop. The prevalence of forum shopping is a direct by-product of the
existing statutory framework.
Forum shopping conjures negative images of a manipulable legal
system in which justice is not imparted fairly or predictably. The idea
6. See LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, 1999 ANNuAL REPORT OF THE DIRECrOR, at
23, http://www.uscourts.govljudbus1999/contents.thml (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) (showing in Table 3 that in 1999 there were 646 judges).
7. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22,39-40 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("Venue is often a vitally important matter, as is shown by the frequency with which
parties contractually provide for and litigate the issue. Suit might well not be pursued, or
might not be as successful, in a significantly less convenient forum.").
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that some jurisdictions will be preferred because of bias towards one
party is troubling. Forum shopping forces the acknowledgment that
the promise of equal, consistent, and uniform application of justicethe legal positivist ideal-is unattainable in a system in which the law
is administered by human beings. 8 In addition to these normative
implications, forum shopping creates economic inefficiency in the
legal system. If all patent cases were resolved predictably and
uniformly by the district courts, there would be no need for forum
shopping. There would in fact be a reduction in litigation because
parties would be more likely to settle if they could accurately forecast
outcome.9
This Article addresses four major questions: What motivates
litigants to forum shop? Can variation in patent case resolution
among jurisdictions be substantiated? Is jurisdictional variation and
the resulting forum shopping good or efficient? Can forum shopping
be reduced or eliminated? Part I outlines how and why parties try to
control forum selection. Focusing on the jurisdiction and venue laws
for patent cases, this Part also examines where patent cases may be
brought. Part II is the core empirical portion of the Article. It
describes the data set used in this study, its development and
composition, and the methodology used to analyze the data. The
8. Jim R. Carrigan, Foreword to W. STUART DORNETTE & ROBERT R. CROSS,
FEDERAL JUDICIARY ALMANAC, at v (1986) ("The choice of forum and the choice of
philosophical approach to a case will be critical choices as long as society chooses judges
from the ranks of human beings.").
9. Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement
Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REv. 319, 324 (1991) ("[I]f
plaintiffs and defendants always agreed in their predictions of trial outcomes, there would
be no trials at all."); Leandra Lederman, PrecedentLost: Why Encourage Settlement, and
Why Permit Non-Party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 221, 259
(1999) ("[Finding a settlement range depends on similar estimates of trial outcome by
each side and the absence of strategic behavior."). Of course, a party might choose not to
settle for strategic reasons despite increased clarity in the ability to predict outcome.
Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: CivilJury Verdicts in a System Gearedto
Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1, 57 (1996) (noting that litigants may prefer resolution over
settlement in order to obtain public vindication); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie,
PsychologicalBarriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 107, 109-11 (1994) (suggesting that if the ligitant views the opposition as morally
blameworthy, he may be unlikley to accept an otherwise reasonable offer); Russell
Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the
Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 79-80 (1997) (listing reasons litigants might not
behave in accordance with the economic predictions). In patent cases, a party's interest in
the ramifications of a final disposition of the infringement suit may be significant enough
to eliminate efficient settlements. For example, one party may be particularly interested
in having the court construe the patent claims because the construction could impact
future development of products or future infringement suits. The accused infringer may
strive to invalidate the patent to clear the way for additional product lines.
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data show significant variations in district court resolution of patent
cases. The variations may be broadly characterized in two ways:
Both differences influence forum
procedural and substantive.
selection and outcome. Procedurally, I examine how district courts
vary in speed of case resolution, the litigation stage at which
resolution occurs, and the method by which district courts resolve
patent disputes. Substantively, I examine how win rate data vary
regionally. I categorize the outcome data by substantive issue to
explore regional variations in validity, enforceability, infringement,
and willfulness. Finally, I discuss the significant difference in patent
holder win rate based on who selected the forum-patent holder or
accused infringer.
Part III focuses on the pitfalls of forum shopping. Specifically, it
considers whether the jurisdictional variation reflected in the data is
appropriate or efficient for the legal system by examining its effects
on the predictability, uniformity, and consistency of the law. Part IV
recommends changes in patent case adjudication focusing on
minimizing the continued viability of forum shopping. I discuss ways
to eliminate forums and eliminate shopping in order to maximize
efficiency and the innovation incentive animating the patent system.
In particular, I consider the creation of a specialized trial court to
decide patent cases or, in the alternative, more restrictive venue
requirements to minimize the ability of parties to forum shop.
I. JURISDICTION IN PATENT CASES: ANYTHING GOES

A patent holder may initiate suit in any federal district court
where personal jurisdiction and venue requirements are met.
Personal jurisdiction is not unique to patent law and requires only
that the defendant have purposeful minimum contacts with the
district in which the case is brought."° The minimum contacts rule
provides fair warning to non-residents that they may be subject to
litigation in that forum." In patent cases, this inquiry involves the
consideration of three factors: whether the defendant purposefully
directed activities at residents of the district, whether the claim relates
to the defendant's activities within the district, and whether personal
jurisdiction over the defendant in the district is reasonable and fair.12
10. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,474-75 (1985).
11. See, e.g., Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1565 (Fed.
Cir. 1994).
12. Akro Corp. v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 1545-46 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see R. Scott Weide,
Patent Enforcement Deterrence: LiberalAssertions of PersonalJurisdictionin Declaratory
Judgment Actions, 65 UMKC L. REv. 177, 178 (1996) (arguing that liberal findings of
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Personal jurisdiction requirements are usually met if the defendant
sells, offers to sell, or licenses others to sell products to residents of

the forum. 3 Hence, any company that operates in national commerce
is likely subject to personal jurisdiction in many possible districts.
Venue is supposed to be a distinct and separate requirement
from personal jurisdiction. 14 Personal jurisdiction focuses on the
power of the court over the parties, while venue focuses on the

convenience of the particular jurisdiction for the parties to litigate the
suit, particularly the defendant. 5 Patent cases have their own venue
statute that permits a patent suit to be brought in "the judicial district
where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed

acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of
business."16 With respect to individuals, the defendant resides where
she is domiciled. 7

With respect to corporations, the defendant

resides, for venue purposes, in any judicial district where personal

personal jurisdiction in patent declaratory judgment suits conflict with patent holder rights
and public policy).
13. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)
("[I]f the sale [by] a manufacturer or distributor ...arises from the efforts of the
[defendants] to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product ... it is not
unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those states."); Beverly Hills Fan Co., 21 F.3d at
1565 ("The allegations are that defendants purposefully shipped the accused fan into
Virginia through an established distribution channel. The cause of action for patent
infringement is alleged to arise out of these activities. No more is usually required to
establish specific jurisdiction."); Imagineering, Inc. v. Van Klassens, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 329,
331-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding the sale of two allegedly infringing rocking chairs
sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over the defendants). Simply sending a ceaseand-desist letter without more activity in a forum state is not enough to satisfy the
minimum contacts requirement and subject the defendant to personal jurisdiction. Red
Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
Genetic Implant Sys., Inc. v. Core-Vent Corp., 123 F.3d 1455, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Moreover, simply operating a Web site that advertises a product does not satisfy the
minimum contacts requirement. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp.
1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) ("If the defendant enters into contracts [over the Internet] ...
personal jurisdiction is proper.... [Whereas, a] passive Web site that does little more
than make information available to those who are interested in it is not grounds for the
exercise of personal jurisdiction." (citations omitted)).
14. See 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 3801 (2d ed. 1986) (noting that venue and jurisdiction are distinct requirements).
15. See Charles S. Ryan, The Expansion of Patent Venue Under the Judicial
Improvements and Access to Justice Act, 77 J. PAT. & TM. OFF. Soc'Y 85, 86 (1995); see
also Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. W. Conference of Teamsters, 722 F. Supp. 725, 727 (N.D. Ga.
1989) ("[T]he fundamental and historical purpose of venue ... is that there is a particular
court or courts in which an action 'should be brought' for convenience of the parties,
particularly that of defendant.").
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1994).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1400 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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jurisdiction is proper.18 Traditionally, the patent venue statute was
the "sole and exclusive provision controlling venue in patent
infringement actions" and was not supplemented by the general
venue statute. 19 They were distinct statutes.
The interpretation of the patent venue statute has been the
subject of considerable judicial inquiry and expansion over the years.
While an individual "resides" where she is domiciled, there has been
some controversy as to the correct construction for corporations.
Prior to the 1988 amendments to the general venue statute, the term
"resides" in the patent venue statute was interpreted as permitting
suit to be brought only in the corporation's state of incorporation.20
The second possible venue option was "where the defendant has
committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established
place of business."21 This language was originally interpreted as a
fixed physical facility requirement0 2 The Federal Circuit broadened
this test, interpreting the regular and established place of business
language as meaning "whether the corporate defendant does its
business in that district through a permanent and continuous presence
there and not.., whether it has a fixed physical presence. "'
In 1988, Congress amended the general venue statute to provide
that a corporate defendant "reside[s] in any judicial district in which it
is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is filed. 24
This provision substantially broadened the number of potential
venues where litigation could be initiated-from the state of
incorporation to any district in which there is personal jurisdiction,
which for national companies is effectively any jurisdiction. Despite
the historical separation of the general venue and the patent venue
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1994); VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917
F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
19. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222,229 (1957).
20. See id at 229 (stating that a corporation "resides" under the patent venue statute
in its state of incorporation).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
22. Mastantuono v. Jacobsen Mfg. Co., 184 F. Supp. 178, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
Mastantuono held that, in order to establish venue in patent litigation, a simple showing
that the defendant was "doing business" in the jurisdiction would not suffice. Rather, the
court stated, "It must appear that a defendant is regularly engaged in carrying on a
substantial part of its ordinary business on a permanent basis in a physical location within
the district over which it exercises some measure of control." Id.; see also Dual Mfg. &
Eng'g, Inc. v. Burris Indus., Inc. 531 F.2d 1382, 1386-88 (7th Cir. 1976) (finding
jurisdiction proper because defendant had a regular and established place of business in
the judicial district).
23. In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
24. Pub. L. No. 87-748, 76 Stat. 744 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)
(1994)).
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provisions, in VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co.' the
Federal Circuit determined that this modified definition of "resides"
also applied to broaden the patent venue statute. 6 Hence, after the
1988 amendment, a corporation "resides," for purposes of the patent
venue statute, in any district where personal jurisdiction is proper.2 7
This result rendered superfluous the patent venue statute for
corporate defendants.
These liberalizations of the jurisdiction and venue statutes,
combined with the technological feasibility and ease of national
commerce, have greatly expanded the plaintiff's choice of forum,
which in turn has intensified and facilitated forum shopping. This
means that national corporations may be sued in virtually any U.S.
district court. Potential defendants do have several vehicles for
leveling the playing field-namely, declaratory judgment actions and
transfer statutes that permit them to request a change of venue when
such a transfer is in "the interest of justice. ' 28 Transfer motions,
however, are not frequently granted, in part because courts give
substantial deference to the plaintiff's choice of forum in determining
whether to transfer.2 9 In determining whether to transfer an action to
another district court where venue and jurisdiction are proper, the
court considers the following factors: deference to the plaintiff's
choice of forum, convenience to the parties, convenience to witnesses
and counsel, differences in costs of litigation in the two forums, the
ease of access to sources of proof, congestion of the courts' dockets,
and the interest in having local controversies decided at home. 0

25. 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
26. The court's conclusion was based on the language in the amended statute "[flor
purposes of venue under this chapter." Id at 1578 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)). The
Federal Circuit held that the plain meaning of this language indicated congressional intent
to expand the definition of "resides" everywhere that term was used in the chapter,
including 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). Id.at 1580.
27. Id.at 1578. Prior to VE Holding, "resides" under § 1400(b) meant the state of
incorporation only. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 226

(1957).

28. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994 and Supp. IV 1998).
29. See Hollyanne Corp. v. TFr, Inc., 199 F.3d 1304, 1307 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("A
transfer of venue for the convenience of the parties normally requires that the court give
great weight to the plaintiff's choice of forum and then weigh the convenience of both
parties."); KIMBERLY A. MOORE ET AL., PATENT LITIGATION & STRATEGY 80 (1999);
cf Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shoppingfor a Venue: The Need for More Limits on Choice,
50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 267, 320 (1996) (arguing that a plaintiff's choice of forum should
only be given deference if that choice was based on demonstrable convenience).
30. Gen. Foam Plastics Corp. v. Kraemer Exp. Corp., 806 F. Supp. 88, 89 (E.D. Va.
1992); E. Scientific Mktg., Inc. v. Tekna-Seal, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 173, 180 n.13 (E.D. Va.
1988).
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Given the breadth of these factors, transfer is a complicated inquiry
very much at the discretion of the district court.3 '
Another option for a potential infringer is to act offensively in
the forum selection process by bringing a declaratory judgment
action. When the infringer brings a declaratory judgment action, it
initiates the lawsuit and thereby chooses the forum.32 A declaratory
judgment action, however, can only be brought if an actual
controversy exists between the parties33 because courts may not issue
advisory opinions3 4 An actual controversy exists in patent disputes
when there is (1) an explicit threat or other action by the patentee
which creates in the infringer an objectively reasonable apprehension
of being sued and (2) present potentially infringing activity or
concrete steps taken with the intent to conduct such activity. 35 When
the patentee sends the accused infringer a cease-and-desist letter
accusing a specific product of infringement and threatening litigation
if remedial action is not taken, declaratory judgment jurisdiction is
easy for the accused infringer to establish.36 In the absence of an
explicit threat, courts consider the following in assessing whether
there is a reasonable apprehension of suit: the patentee's willingness
and capacity to sue (Has the patentee sued others? Has the patentee
sued this defendant before?), the relationship between the parties at
the time of the suit (Are the parties in on-going licensing
negotiations?), and the nature of the contacts between the parties
regarding this patent (Has the patent holder made any specific
allegations? Has the patentee offered the defendant a license? Did
the patentee contact the defendant directly or as part of a mass
mailing?).37
Personal jurisdiction and venue requirements for a declaratory
judgment plaintiff are governed by the general venue statute rather
31. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (granting discretion to the district
court); Reiffen v. Microsoft Corp., 104 F. Supp. 2d 48, 50 (D.D.C. 2000) (indicating that
the district court has discretion to adjudicate motions to transfer on a case-by-case basis).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (1994).
33. Id.
34. Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1326 (Fed. Cir.
1998); Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Ewen, 123 F.3d 1466,1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
35. MOORE, supra note 29, at 29.
36. See, e.g., EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807, 812 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(explaining that a letter threatening litigation creates a reasonable apprehension of suit).
But see Lisa A. Dolak, DeclaratoryJudgment Jurisdictionin Patent Cases: Restoring the
Balance Between the Patentee and the Accused Infringer, 38 B.C. L. REV. 903, 944-47
(1997) (advocating a more liberal application of the actual controversy requirement for
declaratory judgments in order to permit increased utilization of this equalizing tool).
37. MOORE, supra note 29, at 29.
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than the specific patent venue statute 38 because a declaratory
judgment action is not considered a "civil action for patent
infringement." 9 At present, the patent venue statute and the general
venue statute are interpreted identically for corporations and turn on
whether there is personal jurisdiction over the defendant.40
Before litigation over personal jurisdiction and venue even
begin, parties may forum shop with the intent of gaining the
jurisdictional upperhand. Forum shopping involves "the practice of
choosing the most favorable jurisdiction or court in which a claim
might be heard."41 In most civil litigation, forum shopping can occur
horizontally or vertically. Vertical forum shopping is the choice
between filing suit in state or federal court. If the plaintiff files suit in
state court, the defendant may have the option of removing the suit to
federal court under limited circumstances, such as diversity of
citizenship.42 Generally, vertical forum shopping is not a concern in
patent cases because federal district courts have original and
exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over any civil action arising
under the patent laws.43 Horizontal forum shopping, the selection of
a particular district court from the many different possible district
courts, is the type of forum shopping that occurs in patent cases.
The selection of a forum initially belongs exclusively to the
plaintiff who files the lawsuit. There are many reasons that a party
may believe that a particular jurisdiction is preferable. In selecting a
forum the plaintiff (or defendant in a declaratory judgment action)
would likely consider the following: the knowledge, background, and
experience of the judges; the judges' previous experience with high
technology or patent matters; the characteristics, predispositions, and
biases of potential jurors; the attorney's familiarity with the district
and the judges in the district; the local rules of the district court; the
practices of the judges in the district regarding whether they conduct
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1994 and Supp. IV 1998).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1400 (1994 and Supp. IV 1998).
40. See supra notes 14-27 and accompanying text.
41. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 666 (7th ed. 1999).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994 and Supp. IV 1998). Removal is generally permitted
whenever the case could have been brought originally infederal court. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a) (1994).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994 and Supp. IV 1998). Courts determine if a case arises
under the patent laws using the well-pleaded complaint rule. Christianson v. Colt Indus.
Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809 (1988); see also Emmette F. Hale, III, The "Arising
Under" Jurisdictionof the FederalCircuit: An Opportunityfor Uniformity in Patent Law,
14 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 229, 242-43 (1986). Some patent issues, such as disputes over
licensing or assignments, can be brought in state court because they are a matter of state
contract law rather than federal patent law.
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Markman hearings; at what point in the litigation the claims will be
construed; the type of evidence the judges will consider in construing
the claims;" the court's docket and its speed in resolving cases; the
reputation of the parties in the district; and, of course, traditional
factors, such as the convenience for the parties, witnesses and
attorneys. 45
Convenience issues once were the driving factor in venue

selection for the parties. In this age of national and international
commerce, however, convenience of the parties, witnesses, and
location of evidence is becoming less significant in the parties'
calculus than other considerations, particularly characteristics of the
court such as speed, familiarity with technology, and familiarity with
patent cases.46 For example, a patent holder may prefer to initiate its
lawsuit in a jurisdiction with sufficient familiarity with patent cases,
such as the District of Delaware or the Eastern District of Virginia
("Rocket Docket"), 47 in the hope of an expedient resolution of their
proprietary rights. The patent holder may believe that a fast
jurisdiction will give the infringer less time to scour the earth looking
for invalidating prior art and less time to mount a defense in general.
The infringer may prefer the Northern District of California" because
of a belief that it is likely to obtain a jury with more sophistication in

44. Markman hearings are evidentiary hearings held by district courts to assist the
court in construing patent claims. District courts have discretion to conduct these hearings
(or not conduct them) in any manner they see fit. They may construe the patent claims
solely on the briefs submitted by the parties, or they may hold an evidentiary hearing (a
mini-trial) with the presentation of extrinsic evidence on claim construction, including
witness testimony, learned treatises, or other evidence of claim term meaning. Markman
hearings are named after the Supreme Court decision, Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996), which established that claim construction is the exclusive
province of judges rather than juries.
45. In many areas of the law, the plaintiff may also consider the law of the appellate
court (circuit court) in a particular forum. The creation of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit has eliminated this consideration from the calculus. All
patent infringement suits and declaratory judgment actions are appealed exclusively to the
Federal Circuit. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a) (1993 & West Supp. 2000). There is no shopping
among the regional circuits.
46. Gita F. Rothschild, Forum Shopping, LITIGATION, Spring 1998, at 40,40 ("But as
cases have become bigger and the world has become smaller, lawyers are placing
increasingly less emphasis on personal convenience.").
47. The Eastern District of Virginia has been dubbed the "Rocket Docket" because
of the fast adjudication that occurs in the jurisdiction.
48. The Northern District of California is presently the only district with local
procedural rules for patent cases mandating the procedure and practice the court will
follow. N.D. CAL. Civ. P. 16-7(a); see also Mark L. Austrian & Shaun Mohler, Timing is
Everything in Patent Litigation-Fulfillingthe Promise of Markman, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 227,
232-35 (1999) (discussing Northern District of California rules for patent cases).
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technology

or

computer

technology

because

of

the

characteristics of the San Jose or Palo Alto population from which

the jury would be pulled. The infringer may hope that a tech-savvy
jury will be more likely to understand the technical distinctions
between its device and the patent claims and would therefore be less
likely to find infringement.4 9
With borderless commerce the norm and with lax jurisdiction

and venue requirements, plaintiffs in patent cases have an unfettered
choice of where to bring suit. This Article attempts to ascertain
whether forum really matters by determining whether there are

statistically significant differences in adjudication by different
districts.
II. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
There is virtually no empirical literature on the impact of forum
selection in civil litigation and none at all on patent cases after the
creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982.50 This Article presents the
empirical results of a study of patent litigation from 1983 to 1999 in
order to analyze all trials since the formation of the Federal Circuit.
The Administrative Office of the United States Courts compiles

statistics on terminated cases by subject matter, including the parties,
docket number, dates of filing and termination of the suit, the
monetary demand for damages by the plaintiff, the judicial district,
the procedural circumstances of the termination (whether
termination was by court action prior to trial, by settlement, or after a
trial), whether the case was tried to a judge or jury, which party
49. Interestingly, both of these predictions turn out to be inaccurate in light of the
empirical evidence. The District of Delaware has a relatively low patent holder win rate
and the Northern District of California has the highest patent holder win rate. See infra
Table 8 and accompanying text.
50. Professors Kevin Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg conducted a meaningful
analysis of the impact of forum shopping on outcome in civil cases by examining different
procedural methods of resolution practiced by different courts. Kevin M. Clermont &
Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcisingthe Evils of Forum Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1507
(1995). Clermont and Eisenberg also considered outcome variation based on cases in

which the plaintiff obtained her choice of forum versus cases that were successfully
transferred by the defendant. Id. at 1530. They concluded that the existence of the
section 1404(a) transfer option counters detriments of forum shopping. Id. Their
research, which was based on cases adjudicated between 1979 and 1991, did not compare
individual districts, consider tried issues, or study patent cases. Two pre-Federal Circuit
empirical studies also substantiated the significance of forum shopping by documenting
variations amongst the regional circuits in the resolution of patent cases. See generally
KOENIG, supra note 3 (including a comparison of the decisions between the courts of
appeals by circuit regarding adjudicated patents); Federico, supra note 3 (limiting analysis,
however, to published opinions).
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prevailed in the suit, and what relief was granted. I looked at the data
provided by the Administrative Office for all patent cases terminated
by any means in every district court during the five-year period from
1995 to 1999 (9615 cases), and I collected detailed information on all
patent cases that went to trial during the seventeen-year period from
1983 to 1999 (1409 cases). 5' For the tried cases, I acquired
information including: (1) party names and docket number, (2) date
the suit was filed and date of termination, (3) judicial district where
the proceedings occurred, (4) stage of proceedings when the
termination occurred and the manner of the termination (summary
judgment, settlement, motion to dismiss, or trial, for example), (5)
whether the adjudicator was judge or jury, (6) which party prevailed
in the suit (patentee or alleged infringer 2 ), (7) which party was the
patentee, (8) whether the fact finder held the patent valid or invalid,53
(9) whether the fact finder held the patent enforceable or
unenforceable, (10) whether the fact finder held the patent infringed
or not infringed, and (11) whether the fact finder held the patent
willfully infringed or not willfully infringed. This data set includes
detailed information on every bench trial and every jury trial that has
taken place in all patent cases in the last seventeen years in every
district court. It consists of a defined population of 1409 cases
comprising 1943 separate claims. This is the entire population of
patent trials, not a sample study that chooses a limited number of
trials and not only reported trials. There were 1409 patent cases that
made it to trial, but only 1207 were actually resolved after trial by the
51. The Administrative Office was the original source for general information on the
trial data, but I personally studied each trial reported to the Administrative Office to
acquire more complete information. For a discussion of some deficiencies in the
Administrative Office data, see Kimberly A. Moore, Judge, Juries and Patent Cases: An
EmpiricalPeek Inside the Black Box, 98 MICH. L. REv. 365, 381 (2000). To overcome the
deficiencies, I personally researched and verified the cases for which detailed information
on outcome was collected in the data set of tried cases from 1983 to 1999 (1409 cases).
These data were collected by researching public records, such as court opinions and news
reports, and by collecting special verdict forms and judgment sheets from the district
courts. For the data set of all cases terminated from 1995 to 1999, I relied upon the
Administrative Office data regarding procedural termination stage and case filing and
termination dates.
52. Throughout the results and tables, I will refer to the alleged infringer as the
"infringer" for brevity.
53. When patents are issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO), they are presumed valid. 35 U.S.C.A. § 282 (West 1984 and Supp. 2000).
Accordingly, the infringer has the burden of proving the patent invalid by clear and
convincing evidence. See Environ Prods., Inc. v. Furon Co., 215 F.3d 1261, 1265 (Fed. Cir.
2000). Since patents are already valid when validity is challenged, the court holds the
patent invalid or not invalid. But for brevity, I will refer to patents as adjudicated valid or
invalid throughout the tables and results.
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fact finder. The other 202 were either settled during trial, or the court
ruled on directed verdict or judgment as a matter of law prior to
resolution by the fact finder.
In the next Subpart, I analyze these data to highlight which
districts are selected most often by plaintiffs for patent suits and
explore the speed of resolution, the stage of resolution, and the
resolution mechanism. For each of these issues, I consider whether
resolution differs by region. I also examine who selects forum to
determine whether choice significantly impacts outcome.
Where the Patent CasesAre Brought
A preliminary approach to determining how much forum
shopping exists is to examine whether patent cases are equally
dispersed among the country's ninety-four district courts or largely
consolidated in a few regions. The ten jurisdictions with the largest
number of patent cases resolved between 1995 and 1999 are
contained in Table 1.

A.

Table 1: Civil and Patent Caseloads from 1995-1999
District

# of patent
cases

% of all
patent

% of all
civil

Ratio of patent
cases to civil

cases

cases54

cases

1

C.D. Cal.

870

9.1

4.2

2.2

2
3
4
5
6

N.D. Cal.
N.D. Ill.
S.D.N.Y.
D. Mass.
D. Del.

606
569
394
319
308

6.3
5.9
4.1
3.3
3.2

2.3
3.4
4.1
1.4
0.3

2.7
1.7
1.0
2.4
10.7

7
8
9
10

S.D. Fla.
E.D. Va.

302
288

3.1
3.0

2.5
1.7

D.N.J.
D. Minn.

286
276

3.0
2.9

2.6
1.0

1.2
1.8
1.2
2.9

These data indicate that most patent cases are brought in only a
handful of jurisdictions. As Table 1 reflects, these regions do not
54. The data in this column are derived from the Administrative Office annual
reports. 1999 ADMIN. OFF. U.S. Crs. ANN. REP., at Table C (1995 to 1999) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
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have more patent cases simply by virtue of the fact that they have
larger dockets in general. The top five district courts have 29% of all
patent cases terminated in the ninety-four district courts during this
five-year period, but only 15% of all civil case terminations during the
same period. The top ten jurisdictions combined have 44% of all
patent cases terminated, but only 23.5% of all civil cases terminated.
The case distribution in a district like the Southern District of New
York, which had 4.1% of all patent terminations from 1995 to 1999
and 4.1% of all civil case terminations from 1995 to 1999, does not
raise any red flags. The ratio of patent cases to civil cases is 1.0.
However, jurisdictions like Delaware, Massachusetts, the Northern
and Central Districts of California, the Eastern District of Virginia,
the Northern District of Illinois, and Minnesota, where there are
sizeable differences between civil case terminations and patent case
terminations, raise questions. Each of these jurisdictions handles a
much higher percentage of the nationwide patent caseload than they
do of all civil cases.
Because the size of the dockets does not adequately explain the
consolidation of patent cases in particular districts, there must be a
perceived or real difference between these jurisdictions and others
that explains the higher number of patent case filings. It could be that
these jurisdictions contain clusters of high-tech industries; certainly
this could be true for the Northern District of California, which is
home to Silicon Valley. Perhaps increased technological wealth and
thriving industry translate into more patents and therefore more
patent disputes. To evaluate this hypothesis, Table 2 shows the
number of patents granted in each state from 1995 to 1999. 51

55. The data for this table (excluding the last column) were derived from the USPTO
Web site. USPTO, Statistical Reports Available for Viewing, at http://www.uspto.govl
webloffices/ac/ido/oeip/tafltafp.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2001) (listing statistics on patents
granted each year) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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Table 2: Number of Patents Granted by State from 1995-1999
Ranking by # of
Patents Granted

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Un
21
32

State

California
New York
Texas
New Jersey
Illinois
Michigan
Pennsylvania
Ohio
Massachusetts
Florida
Minnesota
Virginia
Delaware

# of
Patents
Granted
63,590
27,099
23,825
16,786
16,486
15,986
15,386
14,382
14,122
11,511
10,380
4593
2049

%of
Patents
Granted to

% of
Patent
Cases

U.S. Parties

by State

18.6
7.9
7.0
4.9
4.8
4.7
4.5
4.2
4.1
3.4
3.0
1.3
0.6

18.7
7.7
6.8
3.0
6.4
3.6
3.4
3.6
3.3
5.3
2.9
3.2
3.2

56

The data presented in Table 2 have several shortcomings. First,
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) data
consider the number of patents granted in the entire state and do not

break down the state grants by judicial district. For example,
California, which is responsible for approximately twice as many
patent grants as the next closest state, is composed of four judicial
districts. There is no way to determine which of these four districts is
responsible for the bulk of the patent grants or whether the grants are
equally divided among the four districts.5 7 Second, the USPTO
classifies the state of patent origin according to the state of residence

of the first named inventor. This classification may not accurately
reflect the state of origin of the technology, because inventors may be

listed in any order, alphabetical or otherwise. Moreover, these data
do not reflect the assignee's location, and it is the assignee rather than
the individual inventors that generally brings a lawsuit to enforce the

56. This data includes all patent case terminations in all judicial districts within a
particular state.
57. This is not a problem when analyzing single-district states like Delaware and
Massachusetts.
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patent 8 Finally, it could be that the location of the companies
bringing patent infringement suits does not correspond to the states
where they bring suit despite similar patent grant and case data. For
example, a Massachusetts company could bring suit in New York, and
a New York company could bring suit in Massachusetts.
Despite these shortcomings, Table 2 does suggest that more
patent cases may be filed in some jurisdictions because they simply
have more technology as reflected in patent grants. This holds true
for California districts which comprise 18.7% of all patent case
terminations (C.D. Cal. (9.1%), N.D. Cal. (6.3%), E.D. Cal. (.7%),
and S.D. Cal. (2.6%)) and 18.6% of all patents granted during the
same time period. Similarly, New York, Texas, and Minnesota patent
case percentages approximate their national patent grant
percentages. 5 9 These data suggest that at least in these jurisdictions,
high patent case filings correlate to clusters of high tech industry. In
these regions, parties may bring their lawsuits on their own turf
because they perceive a home-field advantage or because the
jurisdiction is simply the most convenient forum in which to litigate
their dispute. 6°
For jurisdictions such as Virginia and Delaware, the presence of
patent seeking companies within their borders does not explain the
high number of patent cases filed. Delaware is sixth in terms of the
number of patent cases terminated with 3.2% of the total patent
cases, yet it is thirty-second among the fifty states in terms of patents
granted (0.6%) during the same time period. Virginia is eighth in
patent cases (3.2%) but twenty-first in patent grants (1.3%). In short,
these regions are not selected because they have clusters of high
technology within their borders. Although patent grant data may
indicate that in some jurisdictions clusters of patent seeking
companies could be responsible for the high percentages of patent

58. Researching the principal place of business or headquarters of the parties involved
in the lawsuit would likely be a more accurate way of assessing whether individual parties
are engaging in forum shopping that reflect a selection based on home-field advantage.
59. As discussed above, there is no difference, however, between the percent of
patent filings in the Southern District of New York and the percent of civil filings
generally. It is possible that the Southern District of New York's patent case percentage is
consistent with its civil docket generally and also consistent with the quantity of
technology as measured by patent grants.
60. These conclusions are subject to the caveats discussed above with regard to the
shortcomings of the USPTO data and, in particular, the fact that state of origin of the first
named inventor may not reflect the location of the party who owns the patent and brings
the suit. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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cases filed, in other jurisdictions forum shopping is based upon less
obvious factors.
This evidence indicates that the location of the manufacturing
facility no longer dictates forum and that with increasingly national
commerce plaintiffs have a virtually limitless choice of forum. In
those regions with a higher concentration of industry, companies
might perceive a home-field advantage or perceive the judges or
juries in these regions to be favorable. Some forums are selected for
convenience of trial counsel. Cases are being filed in these regions
not because of limiting jurisdiction and venue options, but rather
because plaintiffs (which are predominantly patent holders) prefer
these regions for some reason. In the following Subparts, I examine
the procedural and substantive differences in adjudication of patent
cases to ascertain whether the data can provide any explanation for
forum selection.
B.

ProceduralVariations: How Patent CasesAre Resolved by
DistrictCourts

It is indisputable that there are procedural differences in how
For example, the
various district courts handle patent cases.
Northern District of California has individual procedural rules
regarding patent cases, which were adopted to unify and streamline
procedures for adjudicating patent cases in that jurisdiction. 61 These
rules apply to both patent infringement actions and declaratory
Other
judgment actions brought by the accused infringer. 6
jurisdictions, like the District of Delaware, have uniform jury
instructions for patent cases in order to eliminate substantive
difficulties that may arise in jury instructions. Standard district court
rules and jury instructions undoubtedly help reduce some variation in
adjudication within the district, but because the application of these
rules is limited to the individual district, they do not decrease forum
shopping between districts.63 This Subpart examines whether there is
regional variation in the speed with which districts adjudicate patent
cases and the way in which these cases are resolved.

61. N.D. CAL. CIV. P. 16-7(a) to -8; see also Austrian & Mohler, supra note 48, at 23235 (discussing Northern District of California rules for patent cases).
62. N.D. CAL. CIv. P. 16-7(a) to -8.
63. Cf. Donald Dunner & Gerald Mossinghoff, Increasing Certainty in Patent
Litigation.: The Need for FederalCircuitApproved PatternJury Instructions,10 FED. CIR.
B.J. 273 (2000) (arguing that the Federal Circuit should issue standard patent jury
instructions to increase consistency and certainty in patent cases).
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1. Speed of Adjudication
Speed of adjudication is an important factor in selecting a forum.
Quick resolution may be preferable for several reasons. It limits the
amount of time the defendant has to prepare for trial and therefore
impacts its ability to mount a defense. 64 It also limits the litigation
expenses associated with the case. A case that is resolved in 0.43
years may be less expensive than one that lingers on for 1.5 years.65
Expedient resolution may also be particularly important to the patent
holder in order to obtain a speedy injunction to prevent further66
infringement, to halt price erosion, and to preserve market share.
Hence, plaintiffs may prefer to file in district courts with a track
record of fast resolution.
The mean time for resolution of all 9615 patent cases filed in the
district courts from 1995 to 1999 is 1.12 years. Tables 3 and 4 list the
quickest and slowest districts for resolving patent cases from 1995 to
1999. The length of the lawsuit is measured from the filing date of the
complaint to the final resolution of the case.
Table 3: Quickest Judicial Districts with at Least 50 Cases
District

# of Cases

Mean # of Years

E.D. Va.
W.D. Wis.

288
105

.43
.60

E.D. La.
E.D. Pa.

53
205

.75
.76

W.D. Wash.

180

.77

64. For example, the defendant will have less time to "scorch the earth" seeking
potentially invalidating prior art.
65. Of course, the parties could have more people work on the shorter case or spend
more time on it, then the litigation expenses could be the same as the case lasting one and
a half years.
66. George F. Pappas & Robert G. Sterne, Patent Litigation in the Eastern District of
Virginia,35 IDEA 361,363 (1995).
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Table 4: Slowest Judicial Districts with at least 50 Cases
District
W.D.N.Y.

# of Cases
75

Mean # of Years
1.97

W.D. Pa.

93

N.D.N.Y.
D. Conn.

61
149

1.60
1.59
1.53

S.D. Ind.

87

1.47

Three of the five fastest districts are districts in the "top twenty"
in terms of number of patent cases, and none of the five slowest
districts hit the top twenty. Causation is unclear. Perhaps plaintiffs in
patent cases gravitate towards districts known for faster resolution, or
it could be that with exposure to more patent cases particular districts
become more efficient at resolving these types of cases. This theory
may explain why the Eastern District of Virginia has 3% of all patent
terminations, despite having only 1.7% of all civil litigation. Patent
holders prefer the "Rocket Docket" for filing patent infringement
suits. This theory also explains the high number of patent cases
transferred from the Eastern District of Virginia (16%).67 In fact, in
many cases that are transferred from Virginia the plaintiff explicitly
argues that its choice of Virginia was based at least in part on the
efficiency of Virginia's docket.'8 However, plaintiffs' collective
enthusiasm for Delaware and Massachusetts, both slow districts,
remains unexplained.
2. Procedural Progress at Termination
I examined the Administrative Office database to ascertain at
what litigation stage patent cases are normally resolved. 69 The
database of all patent cases terminated from 1995 to 1999 includes
information on how far the case proceeded at the time judgment was
entered. I grouped these codes into "early," "middle" and "trial."
"Early" indicates that the case was terminated before any significant
67. See Table 7 infra.
68. See, e.g., Acterna v. Adtech, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 936,937 (2001).
69. I am relying on the reportings from the district court to the Administrative Office
regarding procedural termination mechanisms. I have not independently verified the 9615
cases reported with regard to whether the Administrate Office data accurately reported
their procedural dispositions.
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court action. "Trial" indicates that the case was terminated during or
after a trial began. "Middle" includes all other termination times
(after motion, after hearing, after pre-trial conference, etc.). As
Figure 1 shows, few patent cases are resolved during or after trial;
most patent cases are resolved prior to trial.

Figure 1: Percent of Cases by
Procedural Progress
Early
49%

5%
ii

It is helpful to compare Figure 1 with similar data for individual
districts to determine how much variation exists regionally. This
variation does not explain why more cases are filed in the top ten
jurisdictions because, as Figure 2 demonstrates, there is considerable
regional variation among these courts regarding chances of getting to
trial." Hence, if the plaintiff's goal is to get to trial rather than have
the case forced into settlement or be resolved on summary judgment,
Delaware 71 or Virginia would be preferable regions. Table 5 shows
the procedural stage at which the top ten jurisdictions resolve patent
cases.
70. This figure measures cases that went to trial-not the number of claims or issues
that were ultimately tried by a fact finder. Some cases that make it to trial are actually
resolved during trial by dispositive motion or settled on the courtroom steps prior to a
verdict by the fact finder.
71. Curiously, among the top jurisdictions, Delaware has the highest percentage of
cases going to trial. Delaware judges (there are only four active district court judges) have
a lot of exposure to and familiarity with patent cases. Under such circumstances, one
might think judges with this experience might be more inclined to resolve cases by
dispositive motion.
Perhaps Delaware has such a high percentage of patent case filings precisely
because there are only four active district court judges-the "better the devil you know"
theory. Attorneys may simply feel more comfortable filing in Delaware because of their
familiarity with the judges and their practices in patent cases.
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As Table 5 indicates, the top five jurisdictions (in terms of
number of patent cases) generally resolve cases earlier (i.e., no court
action) than the national average (49% early resolution). In fact, the
Northern District of California resolves 70% of all patent cases early
as compared with Minnesota's 34% and Delaware's 31%.72 Very few
cases in the top five districts see the inside of the courtroom. Patent
holders may prefer regions with a history of early resolution of patent
disputes both because of the transaction cost advantages and because
these jurisdictions are less likely to threaten the continued validity
and enforceability of their patent rights. If jurisdictions with high
percentages of early case resolution are forcing more settlements than
other regions, risk averse patent holders may gravitate towards these
forums, as they would be safe havens for their patents.

72. It is interesting to note the stark contrast between the District of Delaware, with
its 23% trial rate, and its geographic neighbor, the District of New Jersey, with its 1% trial
rate. Clearly geographic location does not explain procedural resolution mechanisms.
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Table 5: Procedural Stage of Resolution
District

Early

Middle

Trial

C.D. Cal.
N.D. Cal.
N.D. Ill.
S.D.N.Y.
D. Mass.
D. Del.
S.D. Fla.
E.D. Va.

70%
71%
53%
63%
56%
31%

27%
44%

3%
5%

42%
33%
40%
46%

5%
4%
4%
23%

55%
44%

42%
42%

3%
14%

D.N.J.
D. Minn.

40%
34%

59%
60%

1%
6%

3. Method of Disposition
The database of all patent cases from 1995 to 1999 also indicates
the procedural device used to dispose of the case. Over 83% of the
patent case judgments have one of the following codes: consent
judgment or settlement, default judgment, transfer or remand
(transferred to another district or remanded to a state court),
judgment on trial or directed verdict during trial, or judgment on pretrial motion (such as a Rule 1271 or Rule 5674 motion). 75 Figure 3
shows how these methods of disposition appear in the database.
Another way of looking at the disposition method data is to
compare dismissals with judgments. Of the 9615 cases, 68% were
ultimately dismissed,7 6 6% were remanded or transferred, and 26%
were disposed of by entering a judgment.77

73. FED. R. CIv. P. 12.
74. FED. R. Cv. P. 56.
75. The other judgments bear unusual codes, such as dismissed for want of
prosecution, dismissed for other, judgment on other, judgment on stay pending
bankruptcy, statistical closing, or award of arbitrator. These codes are excluded from
Figure 3.
76. Dismissals include the following codes: want of prosecution, lack of jurisdiction,
voluntary, or settlement.
77. Judgment codes include the following dispositions: default, consent, pretrial
motion, award of arbitrator, stay pending bankruptcy, jury verdict, court trial, directed
verdict, or statistical closing.
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Fig.3: % of Cases By Disposition
Motion
8%
Trial
5%
Transfer
A6%
Other
17%
Default
1%

The fact that so many patent cases are resolved via settlement,
voluntary dismissal, or consent judgment warrants further
exploration. Isolating just the 6007 cases (76% of the data set) which
were resolved via settlement, Table 6 indicates that if settlement is
going to occur, it will usually occur early in the litigation process
before the parties have invested a substantial amount of litigation
costs.
Table 6: Settlement Data
Procedural Process at Settlement
Before Any Court Action
Mid-litigation

% of Settled Cases
34%
51%

After Pre-trial Conference

14%

During or After Trial

1%
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Table 7 contains detailed data on how the top ten jurisdictions
varied according to the procedural disposition of the cases.
Table 7: Method of Disposing of Case
Consent or
Settle
62%
73%
69%

Motion

Judgment
at Trial78

Transfer

Default

7%
9%
8%

2%
4%
5%

4%
3%
6%

2%
0%
2%

49%

5%

4%

5%

2%

4%
2%
7%
4%

3%
15%

3%
7%

0%
0%

S.D. Fla.
E.D. Va.

60%
45%
50%
53%

2%
4%

5%
16%

1%
0%

D.N.J.

68%

5%

1%

6%

0%

D. Minn.

73%

6%

5%

1%

0%

District
C.D. Cal.
N.D. Cal.
N.D. Ill.
S.D.N.Y.
D. Mass.
D. Del.

As Table 7 shows, the procedural means of adjudication for the
top ten jurisdictions varies by region. Many of the top ten district
courts have a high percentage of patent cases resolved via settlement,
consent judgment, or voluntary dismissal. Patent holders might
prefer regions that force early settlement of their claims, which
generally insulate their patents from the possible invalidity and
unenforcability that could result from a trial.79 Patent holders have
more at stake than the infringers because, should the case proceed to
trial, the patent could be invalidated or rendered unenforceable,
which would affect the patent holder's ability to secure damages not
only against the infringer involved in the suit, but against all potential
infringers in the market. The impact of asymmetrical stakes between
When stakes are
litigating parties has been widely studied. 0
78. To the extent that these numbers differ from the trial percentages in Figure 2 and
Table 5, it is because these numbers reflect judgments on jury verdicts and court trials.
Earlier numbers on how many cases reached the trial stage are accurate, but not all of the
cases that reach trial are ultimately resolved on jury or court verdict. Some cases may
settle during trial or be resolved on judgment as a matter of law (JMOL).
79. Early disposition may be an effect, rather than a cause, of forum shopping. That
is, the deluge of claims has caused the jurisdiction to favor settlements.
80. See generally Kathleen Engelmann & Bradford Cornell, Measuring the Cost of
Corporate Litigation: Five Case Studies, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 377 (1988) (studying
asymmetric stakes); Jeffrey S. Parker, Daubert's Debut: The Supreme Court, The
Economics of Scientific Evidence, and the Adversarial System, 4 SuP. Cr. ECON. REV. 1,
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asymmetrical, the party with more at stake is more likely to desire
settlement in close cases and only be willing to proceed to trial in
cases in which they have a greater chance of success. 81 This could
explain the preference of patent holders who file suit in jurisdictions
with a higher than average rate of early settlement. Patent holders
may also prefer regions with high rates of settlement in order to
acquire a list of licensees for their patent. Licensees indicate industry
respect for the patent, which has several benefits. Licenses are
evidence of the non-obviousness of the patent claims 82 and are
therefore useful if the validity of the patent is challenged. Licenses
may also be useful evidence for determining a reasonable royalty rate
for patent damages. 3 Finally, a list of licensees may help the patent
holder enforce its patent absent the need for litigation. Evidence that
competitors capitulated and licensed the patent may make it easier
for the patent holder to secure future licenses.
Notice that jurisdictions such as Delaware and the Eastern
District of Virginia have very high transfer rates for patent cases. It
may well be because of their speed and/or perceived expertise or bias,
a greater number of cases with no real link to the jurisdiction are
routinely filed there. 84 Such filings are further evidence that plaintiffs
43-47 (1995) (noting that changes in the law of evidence will not alter problems such as
asymmetrical stakes); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation,13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 24-25 (1984) (noting that "there are many situations ...
in which the resolution of the dispute affects one of the parties beyond the dollar amount
at stake alone"); Joel Waldfogel, Reconciling Asymmetric Information and Divergent
Expectations Theories of Litigation, 41 J.L. & ECON. 451, 474 (1998) (finding that
"information is less asymmetric among the parties proceeding to trial than among the
parties to all filed cases").
81. See Priest & Klein, supra note 80, at 24-25 (noting that when stakes are
asymmetrical, such as when one party has a greater interest in precedent than the other,
the party with higher stakes is more likely to be victorious in litigation because it is likely
to proceed to trial only on cases in which it has a greater chance of winning).
82. In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding the existence of
licenses should be considered in an obviousness inquiry as it is evidence of industry respect
for the patent); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 87 F.3d 1559, 1569-70 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(noting that objective considerations, such as the existence of licenses, are "invariably
relevant" to an obviousness determination).
83. Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that in
assessing damages, royalty rates for other licenses can be considered); Hanson v. Alpine
Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that a reasonable
royalty damage award may be based on an established royalty amount). Preexisting
licensing rates should be a floor on damage awards, not a ceiling, since they are generally
the result of voluntary agreement obviating the need for litigation. See Maxwell, 86 F.3d
at 1109-10 ("The fact that an infringer had to be ordered by a court to pay damages,
rather than agreeing to a reasonable royalty, is also relevant.").
84. See, e.g., Acterna v. Adtech, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 936, 937 (2001) (rejecting
arguments by the plaintiff that efficiency of the court's docket was a basis for venue when
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forum shop. With transfer generally difficult to obtain because of the
deference given to a plaintiff's choice of forum, 5 a high number of
transferred cases indicates that those cases had virtually no tie to the
forum in which they were filed.
C. Substantive Variation: How Win Rates Differ by District

All of the analysis for this Subpart is performed on the data set
of tried cases from 1983 to 1999 (1409 cases, 1943 claims). 6 In this
Subpart, I examine whether patent holder win rates vary by district,
which could explain preferences for certain forums, assuming that the
parties are aware of these win rate variations.Y
1. Overall Patent Holder Win Rate by District
Overall, patentees won 58% of all patent suits. 88 These data
indicate a statistically significant difference in win rate for the
patentee and infringer by suit (p<.001). Hence we can reject with
99.9% confidence the null hypothesis that either party (patentee or
alleged infringer) has an equal chance of winning a patent lawsuit.8 9
How does this overall win rate compare with the win rate in each
individual judicial district?

Plaintiffs rush to forums in which they

think they have the greatest chances of success. The descriptive
statistics listed in Table 8 on the ten jurisdictions with the largest
the only other tie to Virginia was sales activity); Wayne L. Stoner, Rocket Docket: Still an
Alternative?, 572 PLI/Pat 73, 77-79 (1999) (suggesting that the Eastern District of Virginia
is increasingly transferring cases to other districts in order to combat filings by parties with
little or no connection to the forum who file in Virginia to receive expedited adjudication
of their patent claims).
85. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 50, at 1529 (reporting that in a study of civil
cases, transfer motions occur in less than five percent of cases and they are successful
about forty-five percent of the time).
86. The Administrative Office was the origin of the data. I verified and expanded
these data to make more detailed findings.
87. Although lawyers and other repeat players in patent litigation may have instincts
regarding certain forums, no comprehensive data such as those provided here were
available prior to this Article.
88. See Moore, supra note 51, at 385 (offering possible explanations for the 58%
patent holder win rate).
89. The null hypothesis posits "no difference" in outcome or "no relationship"
between events. In this case, the null hypothesis would be that "patentees are not more
likely to win patent suits than infringers." The p value (also called the significance level) is
the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is actually true. Throughout this
article, I use the term "significant" in the formal statistical sense indicating that the null
hypothesis can be rejected with at least 95% confidence (p_,.05). If p>.05, I conclude that
observed differences or relationships are not statistically significant; thus, the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected in these cases. I have tested these null hypotheses using
Chi-Square p values (the "Pearson statistic").
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number of cases show variation from region to region in patentee win
rates. The districts are listed in order from most to least
advantageous for the patent holder.
Table 8: Win Rate Distribution
District

# of
Patents °

Patentee
Wins

Infringer
Wins

B

Std.
Error

P

N.D. Cal.
D. Minn.

82
48

68%
67%

32%
33%

-.120
-.104

.057
.073

.034
.154

C.D. Cal.
S.D.N.Y.
S.D. Fla.

96
48
24

63%
63%
63%

37%
37%
37%

.062
.062
.062

.053
.073
.102

.238
.393
.541

D.N.J.
E.D. Va.

23
40

61%
58%

39%
42%

.046
-.0123

.104
.080

.659
.878

N.D. Ill.

113

48%

52%

.085

.049

.083

D. Del.
D. Mass.

142
50

46%
30%

54%
70%

.105
.263

.044
.072

.018
.000

A regression model limited to the top ten jurisdictions
demonstrates significant difference in outcome (patent holder win
rate) among these districts.91 Stated another way, there is not an
equal chance of winning in these ten jurisdictions. There is also
significant difference in outcome when you compare the mean win
rate of all districts with the mean win rate of three of these individual
districts. As Table 8 shows, the District of Massachusetts, the District
of Delaware, and the Northern District of California differ
significantly from the mean patent holder win rate (p<.05). If patent
holders knew this information, it could explain why parties select
these districts with greater frequency than other districts. At least
this may be true for the Northern District of California, which in
addition to being a locus of high-tech companies, has a significantly
higher win rate for patent holders. However, because patent suits are

90. The number of patents in each district varies from the total number of patents that
went to trial because the total number reflects some cases which were disposed of after a
trial began by means other than a verdict by the fact finder. Some of the claims were
settled or a verdict was directed by judgment as a matter of law.
91. F=3.355, p=.000. The hypothesis that the district dummy variables are jointly zero
can be rejected. This means that there is significant variation in outcome among these ten
districts.
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predominantly filed by the patent holder,92 the significantly lowerthan-average win rate for patent holders in Delaware and
Massachusetts raises the question: why are these two districts seeing
such a high volume of patent cases?
It is interesting that the District of Delaware is among the least
favorable for patent holders because Delaware's patent caseload far
exceeded its percentage equivalent of civil cases generally. Delaware
has 3.2% of all patent cases nationally, but only 0.3% of all civil cases.
Patent holders file 86% of all patent cases, 93 and Delaware is home to
ten times more patent cases than its civil docket would predict. Thus,
either patent holders are selecting Delaware simply for its
convenience (an unlikely answer in light of the size of the state and
dearth of industry headquartered there) or patent holders are
inaccurately perceiving Delaware to be more favorable to them than
it is.
2. Win Rate by Substantive Issue by District
Table 9 categorizes the overall win rate by substantive issue.
Table 9: Patent Holder Win Rate by Issue
Verdict for Patent Holder

Issue

Validity94
Enforceability
Infringement
Willfulness

67% (1140)
95

73% (528)
66% (1352)
64% (542)

92. See supra notes 73-88 and accompanying text.
93. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
94. Validity of an issued patent might be challenged by the accused infringer. There
are a variety of grounds upon which validity could be challenged, including novelty, nonobviousness, or failure to satisfy the enablement, best mode, or written description
requirements.
95. Enforceability of an issued patent might be challenged by the accused infringer.
There are a variety of grounds upon which a patent may be found unenforceable,
including inequitable conduct, laches, equitable estoppel, or patent misuse.
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Table 10 shows the statistical variation among regions on
resolution of these issues.
Table 10: Percentage and Number of Verdicts for Patent Holder
District
C.D. Cal.

Validity
61%(62)

Enforceability
62% (42)

Infringement
74% (73)

Willfulness

N.D. Ill.
N.D. Cal.

61%(74)
68%(53)

61% (36)
78% (18)

66% (87)
75% (68)

85% (27)
59% (22)

S.D.N.Y.

73%(37)

67% (12)

73% (33)

80% (15)

70% (54)
100% (7)
88% (16)
56% (9)
86% (7)
83% (6)

55%
72%
70%
45%
68%
65%

53% (109)
D. Del.
E.D. Va. 174%(34)
D. Minn. 166% (3 5)
44%(32)
D. Mass.
86%(14)
S.D. Fla.
75% (16)
D.N.J.

(120)
(32)
(46)
(40)
(25)
(17)

67% (39)

61%
69%
63%
42%
67%
67%

(38)
(13)
(16)
(12)

(12)
(3)

Table 10 shows significant variation among the ten judicial
97
96
districts with regard to the issues of validity and infringement.
Hence, the null hypothesis that a patent holder has no greater chance
of winning on infringement or validity in these judicial districts can be
rejected with confidence. Although some individual variation exists
among districts with regard to enforceability and willfulness, as seen
8
in Table 10, the variation is not statistically significant
The descriptive statistics and regression results presented thus far
demonstrate both procedural and substantive variation among the
most frequently selected district courts in their resolution of patent
cases. This variation suggests that there may be no single explanation
of patent holders' selection of particular jurisdictions. Not all of the
frequently selected jurisdictions are fast, not all are locations of high
technology, not all are more favorable to patent holders, and not all
force early resolution of patent cases. It is likely that some
combination of factors led parties to select particular jurisdictions; in
short, the choice of forum is a multi-dimensional inquiry. Perhaps the
2
96. F=2.784, p=.00 .
97. F=2.024, p=.028.
98. This means that I cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no variation2 in
5
outcome with regard to enforceability among these ten districts. F=1.323, p=. 1 .
Similarly, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no variation in outcome of
willfulness among these ten districts. F=1.092, p=.366.
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best way to test the impact the choice of forum may have on outcome
is to consider the difference in outcome or the effect of outcome on
choice when the forum is selected by the patent holder or the accused
infringer. The next Subpart will present the comparison between
infringement suit outcome and declaratory judgment suit outcome.
D. DeclaratoryJudgmentActions vs. Infringement Suits: Choice of
Forums Has a SignificantImpact on Outcome
There is a perception that the infringer will achieve an advantage
by filing a declaratory judgment action against the patentee, rather
than waiting for the patentee to file an infringement suit. 99 By filing
the declaratory judgment action, the infringer chooses the forum (the
one it thinks most favorable to it) and the time that the suit will begin
(enabling it to surprise the patentee and force litigation before the
patentee might be ready). The empirical evidence substantiates the
advantage forum selection has to the parties. In cases in which the
defendant was able to choose the forum (as with declaratory
judgment actions) rather than the patent holder (as in infringement
suits), there was a significant difference in outcome:1" the defendant
is much more likely to win when it selects the forum.
99. See Weide, supra note 12, at 177-78. Professors Clermont and Eisenberg studied
the difference in outcome across all civil cases in which the plaintiff received its choice of
forum versus suits that were transferred by the defendant. They discovered a significant
difference in plaintiff win rate: 58% in forums selected by the plaintiff and 29% percent in
forums where the case had been transferred. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 50, at
1511-12. They concluded that the transfer option might undo abusive forum selection by
plaintiffs and act as a deterrent, thereby encouraging appropriate forum selection in the
first instance. Id. at 1511. They also suggest that transfers level the playing field,
neutralizing any lopsided cost advantage the plaintiff may attempt to secure. Cases are
transferred, according to Professors Clermont and Eisenberg, only when the court decides
that forum really would matter. Id at 1515. My study differs from theirs in several ways.
First, my data set is limited to patent cases, rather than all civil cases, and includes more
recent data. Second, I examine every individual case and study the individual issues
decided rather than just the overall outcome. Third, I independently verify all the results
in the data set in which I studied outcome rather than simply relying on the
Administrative Office data, which I found to be inaccurate in many instances. Fourth, I
study the difference in win rates between patent infringement suits brought by the patent
holder and declaratory judgment actions brought by the accused infringer. This difference
should elucidate the forum selection impact even more acutely.
100. B= 0.125, t=3.063, p=.002. These results from a linear regression model indicate a
statistically significant difference (p<.05) in win rate based upon who filed the suit. In this
regression model, who won (patent holder or infringer) was the dependent variable and
who filed suit (patent holder or infringer) was the independent variable. A p=.002 allows
us to reject the null hypothesis of no difference with 99% confidence (p<.01). The
coefficient, B,gives the magnitude in percentage points of the difference in win rate. With
B=0.125, there is a 12.5% difference in outcome based on who filed suit. For example, the
patent holder won 60.1% of all patent cases when it filed suit and 47.6% of all patent cases
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Of the 1209 cases in the data set of tried cases, 14% (168 cases)
01
were declaratory judgment actions brought by the infringer. 1 Of the
1676 separate claims, 15% were declaratory judgment claims. As
Figure 4 indicates, the declaratory judgment tool does affect the
outcome of each individual issue except willfulness, in which there is
no significant difference in outcome between infringement suits and
declaratory judgment suits.' 2 Who selects the forum (patentee or
alleged infringer) is a statistically significant predictor of who wins
patent claims.103 When the patent holder selects the forum, the patent
holder wins 58% of the claims. When the accused infringer brings a
declaratory judgment action and thereby chooses the forum, the
patent holder win rate drops to 44%.
Fig. 4: Patentee Win Rates By Who Files Suit
,

80 -

• Infringer

*.20

a. 0
Claim

Valid

Enforce

Inf.

Willful

The applicable law does not change from one forum to the next,
but the win rate drops significantly. Who selects the forum is also a
statistically significant predictor of validity,"° enforceability," and
infringement, 0 6 but not willfulness. 0 7 The most likely explanation for

in which the infringer filed suit-a 12.5 percentage point difference.
101. A case is considered a declaratory judgment action if the infringer filed the suit.
These statistics do not include counterclaim declaratory judgment actions.
102. For a more detailed analysis of the distinction between infringement suits and
declaratory judgment actions, see Moore, supra note 51, at 404-07.
103. 8=.141, t=4.106, p=.000.
104. B=-.210, t=-5.628, p=.000.
105. 8=-.207, t=-3.908, p=.000.
106. B=-.163, t=-4.306, p=.000.
107. 8=-.067, t=-1.00, p=.318.
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the declaratory judgment effect is that forum and timing really do
matter.
The best alternative explanation is that declaratory judgment
suits, as a whole, are stronger suits on the merits for the accused
infringers. The theory is that accused infringers would initiate
litigation only in cases they think they should win. Such a theory
might be verifiable if the empirical results-namely, significantly
higher win rate for patent holders in infringement suits rather than
declaratory judgment actions-were from a data set of all patent
disputes rather than just the set of tried cases. One could determine
the percentage of declaratory judgment actions filed and compare
their outcome at all stages and all procedural levels with infringement
suits. However, in this database, which is limited to tried cases from
1983-1999, economic theory suggests the "stronger" declaratory
judgment actions would be resolved by the court at earlier stages of
litigation or settled. The selection of cases that would proceed to trial
would be close cases where the outcome tends towards 50150..' The
selection of tried cases is not a random or a representative subset of
all disputes. 10 9
The selection effect theory is predicated on parties making
rational determinations regarding whether to settle or litigate based
on economic factors, including the potential gain from a favorable
outcome or loss from an adverse decision, the information the parties
possess about the likelihood of success at trial,"0 and the transaction
costs (litigation costs)."' According to this model, the disputes that
proceed to trial are the cases in which the parties substantially
108. See generally Priest & Klein, supra note 80 (observing that cases close to the
decisional standard are less likely to settle because of mutual optimism).
109. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil
Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1568 (1989) (noting that "expectations
theory" suggests that tried cases might not reflect the pool of all disputes); Priest & Klein,
supra note 80, at 4 (noting that "potential litigants form rational estimates of the likely
decisions" and thus "disputes selected for litigation (as opposed to settlement) will
constitute neither a random nor representative sample of the set of all disputes"); see also
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 58

(1960)
(commenting that litigated cases bear the same relationship to the underlying pool of
disputes "as does homicidal mania or sleeping sickness, to our normal life").

110. The selection effect model allows for "divergent expectations" of the parties in
estimating outcome. For example, a patent holder may believe that she has a 60% chance
of winning the case on the merits, whereas the alleged infringer, with the same
information, evaluates the patent holder's chance of success at 40%. Under such
circumstances, both parties may be unwilling to settle the case. The selection effect model
allows for these self-serving estimation errors, but assumes that the errors are random and
based on differences of opinion rather than asymmetrical information.
111. See Priest & Klein, supra note 80, at 4.
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disagree on their chance of success, which is most likely to happen
when the case falls close to the governing decision standard (where
estimated outcome approaches 50%).112 When the legal rules or the
adjudicator clearly favors one side, economically rational behavior
dictates that the parties should settle to avoid transaction costs (or the
case may be resolved by the judge on dispositive motion). The cases
that proceed to trial will be the difficult or close cases in which the
parties are more likely to disagree on predicted outcome. These close
cases should fall more or less evenly113on both sides of the decisional
standard resulting in a 50% win rate.
If the accused infringer has a stronger case on the merits when it
brings a declaratory judgment action, then generally those stronger
cases will be resolved prior to trial and the cases which do proceed to
trial will likely be "close" cases-close as measured by the parties'
estimations of outcome. Economic theory suggests that it is not likely
that the difference in win rate in tried cases may be attributable solely
to declaratory judgments being stronger cases for the infringer. This
element would be factored into litigation strategy and would impact
the selection of cases for trial." 4 Hence, the difference in win rate is
not likely to be attributable to a factor that can be predicted by the
parties as part of their outcome estimations.
In summary, win rates differ significantly between infringement
suits and declaratory judgment suits. Patent holders have a
significantly higher win rate when they file suit and thereby choose
the forum. In contrast, patent holder win rates decline when the
accused infringer files suit and thereby selects the forum. These
differences in win rate are likely attributable to forum, which suggests
that forum critically impacts outcome.
112. Id. at 16.
113. There are other economic models (asymmetrical stakes and asymmetrical
information models) that could alter the Priest & Klein 50% prediction. See id. These
models, however, would not explain the variance in win rate for declaratory judgment
versus infringement suits.
114. The notion that alleged infringers fare better in declaratory judgment actions
because they are "stronger" cases is further disproved by the difference in win rate before
judge and jury. See Moore, supra note 51, at 368. If declaratory judgment actions are
"stronger" suits, then there should be a higher win rate for infringers regardless of the
adjudicator. IL The patent holder win rate in jury trials is 68% for infringement suits and
38% for declaratory judgment actions. Id. However, the patent holder win rate in bench
trials is 49% for infringement suits and 48% for declaratory judgment actions. Id If the
stronger suit theory explained the win rate variance then it would be true for both judge
and jury trials. The data show, however, that patent holder win rate is not affected by who
filed the suit in bench trials. This indicates that the stronger suit theory cannot explain
these results.
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III. PROBLEMS CAUSED BY FORUM SHOPPING
The empirical results show substantive and procedural
differences among district courts in resolving patent cases, Such
variation causes the parties to spend substantial resources in selecting
and fighting over forum. The evils of forum shopping generally
revolve around two themes: (1) the notion that forum shopping
reflects inequity in the legal system" 5 and (2) the premise that forum
shopping is inefficient.
A.

The Normative Evils of Forum Shopping

The notion that the law ought not be manipulable and that its
application ought to be uniform is a fundamental tenet of our legal
system. With borderless commerce, the jurisdictional choices are
bountiful and the importance of consistency among forums becomes
more acute. The intensity of forum shopping by parties suggests that
the view of law as immutable is ultimately unfulfillable." 6 The
existence of statistical disparities in the empirical results presented
substantiates concern over regional variations in patent case
resolution. This manipulability of the administration of law thwarts
the ideal of neutrality in a system whose objective is to create a level
playing field for resolution of disputes."' The ultimate result is
unpredictability and inconsistency in the application of the law among
the district courts. This instability erodes public confidence in the law
and its enforcement and creates doubt about the fairness of the
118
system.
B. The Economic Inefficiency of Forum Shopping?
Commentators question the efficiency of forum shopping for
several reasons. First, it has been argued that forum shopping
overburdens preferred courts with a flood of patent cases. 119 As the
data indicate, a few jurisdictions consistently receive a greater
115. There is a reluctance to acknowledge that outcome can vary by region or
adjudicator when the facts and the law are the same.
116. Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered,103 HARV L. REV. 1677,1685-86 (1990).
117. See George D. Brown, The Ideologies of Forum Shopping-Why Doesn't a
Conservative CourtProtectDefendants?, 71 N.C. L REv. 649, 668 (1993). But see Robert
M. Cover, The Uses of JurisdictionalRedundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22
WM. & MARY L REV. 639, 646-48, 672-80 (1981) (arguing that having many possible
forums with concurrent jurisdiction serves the beneficial function of error reduction and
results in a fairer and more innovative judicial system).
118. Norwood, supra note 29, at 301,305-07.
119. See Note, supra note 116, at 1684,
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number of patent cases, out of proportion with the size of their
dockets generally. This suggests that plaintiffs select these forums
more consistently over alternate forums because of a perception that
these forums are beneficial. This may not, however, actually be
inefficient. Because in theory the total number of cases remains
constant and the only variable is where the cases are brought, it
would be more efficient to have those cases consolidated in discrete
courts that could develop patent law expertise. If most patent cases
were brought in a few choice jurisdictions (creating a group of patent
courts), the judges in those jurisdictions would develop expertise with
patent case management and patent law. These judges would be
more efficient at resolving patent cases; even though the technology
changes from case to case, exposure to the substantive law and its
application would increase judicial efficiency. Over time, these
judges would establish track records, increasing outcome
predictability and decreasing litigation. Hence the status quo, where
plaintiffs have limitless venue options, has resulted in the
consolidation of patent cases among a few select jurisdictions. In this
way, patent holders have effectively created their own specialized
courts, which may be a more efficient system of adjudication than an
equal division of cases among the ninety-four judicial districts.
Maximum efficiency in this respect would be achieved by a single,
specialized trial court for patent dispute resolution.
Second, forum shopping wastes resources by increasing litigation
costs as parties dispute forum or pursue the most favorable forum,
which often is not the closest or most convenient location.120 There
has been some suggestion that existing legal rules, such as personal
jurisdiction requirements, venue requirements, transfer of venue
options, or the forum non conveniens doctrine mitigate these
concerns.12 ' This is a naive view of the legal reality, at least insofar as
patent cases are concerned. Patent litigation is primarily conducted
between corporations. These corporations are subject to personal
jurisdiction wherever they sell products, which is increasingly
nationwide. There is no venue requirement to speak of, because it
devolves into a mere personal jurisdiction inquiry. 2 2 The judicial
doctrine of forum non conveniens is no longer applicable to curb
forum shopping among federal forums because it was superseded by
120. See Ud. at 1691 ("Critics of forum shopping claim that it is inefficient because it
tends to result in litigation far from the 'natural' forum-the one closest to, most
knowledgeable about, or most accessible to the litigants.").
121. Id. at 1691.
122. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
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the transfer statute.12 None of these legal rules mitigates the
inefficiency caused by litigating patent cases in inconvenient forums.
Finally, with regard to transfer motions, resources are wasted in the
fight over the proper venue regardless of who ultimately wins. In
short, it costs money to fight over forum, and it takes time for the
court to handle these transfer motions.124 If forum were more
properly restricted at the outset through venue statutes, as I propose
below, the need for transfer motions would be reduced.
Many commentators believe that transfer motions have, apart
from their transaction costs, beneficial objectives of convenience and
12
justice and that they have helped level the litigation playing field. 5
More likely, they have merely tilted the playing field in the opposite
direction.
If initial forum selection presents an extreme
inconvenience for the defendant and therefore an unfair advantage
for the plaintiff, transfer tilts the advantage towards the defendant.
When a motion to transfer is granted, the plaintiff is not given a
second chance to select a fairer district; rather, the defendant
proposes an alternative district. For example, empirical work by
Professors Clermont and Eisenberg has established a dramatic drop
in plaintiff win rates from 58% of non-transferred cases to 29% of
transferred cases.126 At least one commentator has argued that
transfer motions could help eradicate some of the inequities created
by limitless modern venue statutes if transfer motions were more
easily obtainable.127 If transfer motions were easier to obtain, there
would, of course, be an increase in transfer motions (thereby
increasing wasteful transaction costs) and more cases would
ultimately get transferred (undoubtedly delaying final adjudication
123. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The judicial forum non conveniens
doctrine is limited to international forum conflicts. Norwood, supra note 29, at 318.
124. See David P. Currie, The FederalCourts and the American Law Institute: PartII,
36 U. CHI. L. REV. 268, 307 (1969) (arguing that resolving factually and legally complex
motions to transfer "costs altogether too much time and money"); Edmund W. Kitch,
Section 1404(a) of the JudicialCode: In the Interest of Justice or Injustice?, 40 IND. L.J. 99,
100-01 (1965) (noting courts' concern over the "impact these petitions might have not
only on their own calendars but on the expeditious resolution of the litigation in the
district courts"); Rothschild, supra note 46, at 41 ("Any lawyer experienced with forum
selection battles knows that they can be lengthy, expensive-and uncertain."); David E.
Steinberg, The Motion to Transfer and the Interests of Justice, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
443, 523 (1990) (stating that the transfer motion is "a cumbersome and costly procedure
with few real beneficiaries").
125. E.g., Clermont & Eisenberg, supranote 50, at 1515.
126. Id. at 1511-12.
127. Norwood, supra note 29, at 318-20 (arguing that unjustifiable venue choices could
be restrained by eliminating the present practice of giving substantial deference to the
plaintiff's choice of forum when considering whether to transfer cases for convenience).
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Moreover, the increased
and increasing transaction costs).28
the unpredictability of
motions
will
increase
availability of transfer
the forum selection process, thus making it more difficult for the
defendant to estimate outcome. It will be especially challenging for
the defendant to predict the outcome if it subscribes to the notion
that the plaintiff's choice of forums is not the final word on who
adjudicates the matter. However, if transfer motions were easier to
obtain and the result of transfer was to the forum suggested by the
defendant (rather than the plaintiff's second choice of forum),
plaintiffs would have an incentive to select a fair, convenient forum ex
ante. A more sensible alternative may be to limit forum selection on
the front end to eliminate these added transaction costs.
C. Forum Variation Underminesthe InnovationIncentive
Underlying Patents
With the specter of outcome variation, forum shopping increases
the unpredictability of the law and its application, in turn increasing
the likelihood that parties will litigate. 2 9 The unpredictability in the
legal system created by variation among the district courts intensifies
as the number of potential jurisdictions in which to bring suit
increases. 30 Unpredictable and inconsistent application of laws
traditionally has been a major concern in patent cases and was the
impetus for the creation of the Federal Circuit. 3 '
Intellectual property rights are thought to be critical in spurring
technological innovation.'32 The value of a patent lies in its guarantee
128. Transfers of cases would delay final adjudication due to administrative delay and
start-up time for another district to become involved in the case. There would, however,
likely be an increase in settlements after successful transfer motions if the parties believe
that choice of forum impacts outcome-an avenue for future empirical research.
129. Of course, to the extent that outcome cannot be estimated because of the
unpredictability regarding which forum the defendant will be sued in, that unpredictability
will cease to exist once the litigation is brought (once a forum is determined). After forum
selection, both parties ought to be able to estimate outcome, which would cause
settlement at that point. Hence, the end result is an increase in litigation, but once the
forum is selected-which luckily occurs early in the litigation process-we ought to see
settlement in these cases just as often as in other cases. See supra Table 6 (substantiating a
high rate of settlement-34% of all cases-prior to any court action).
130. Uncertainty exists when parties cannot be sure what legal consequences will
attach to their actions. Such uncertainty could include disagreement over the scope of the
patent (the property line itself is blurry) or an inability to predict how a jury would draw
the line between infringing and non-infringing conduct (an otherwise clearly defined line
viewed through a fun house mirror).
131. S. REP. No. 97-275, at 20 (1981) (Sup. Docs. No. Y1.1/5:97-275).
132. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights
and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1017, 1045 (1989); see also King Instruments
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of exclusivity, providing the patent owner a defined property right.
This value depends on the boundaries of the property right,
competitors' respect for those boundaries, and the ability of the
patentee to enforce them. If the property owner's ability to enforce
her patent is inefficient or unpredictable, the patent's value decreases
for the patent owner, competitors, and the public thereby stifling
innovation and competition.1 33
Unpredictability or uncertainty in the boundaries of the patent
holder's property right and its enforceability will have several
It will divert resources from innovative efforts
ramifications.
(research and development) to enforcement (transaction or litigation
costs),13 4 decreasing the value of the property right and thereby
decreasing its efficacy as a means for promoting innovation.
Moreover, uncertainty in the boundaries of the proprietary right will
expanding or contracting the
decrease innovation by unpredictably
135
patent holder's scope of exclusivity.
Two possible scenarios result when the delineation and
enforcement of property rights are uncertain: (1) competitors will
have less respect for the property right, causing an increase in
Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 950 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that the patent system "creates
an incentive for innovation").
133. In its report to the Secretary of Commerce, the Advisory Commission on Patent
Law Reform warned that the problems associated with the enforcement of patent rights
"have the potential to eradicate the basic incentive provided by the patent system" and
that the inherent value of the patent right can be realized only if the property owner has
effective and inexpensive access to an efficient judicial system. THE ADVISORY
COMMISSION

COMMERCE

ON PATENT LAW

REFORM:

A

REPORT TO THE SECRETARY

OF

75 (1992).

134. Many commentators have lamented the increased transaction costs caused by
unpredictable, fuzzy, or muddy rules. E.g., Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson,
Information, Uncertainty, and the Transfer of Property, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 299, 312-28
(1984) (favoring sharper, clearer rules); Clifford G. Holderness, A Legal Foundationfor
Exchange, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 322-36 (1984) (favoring clear, specific definitions
because they lower information and transaction costs); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud
in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577, 591 (1988) ("Hard-edged rules define assets and
their ownership in such a way that what is bought stays bought and can be safely traded to
others, instead of repeatedly being put up for grabs.").
135. The Markman Court reasoned:
As we noted in General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369
(1938), "[t]he limits of a patent must be known for the protection of the patentee,
the encouragement of the inventive genius of others and the assurance that the
subject of the patent will be dedicated ultimately to the public." Otherwise, a
"zone of uncertainty which enterprise and experimentation may enter only at the
risk of infringement claims would discourage invention only a little less than
unequivocal foreclosure of the field."
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370,390 (1996) (quoting United Carbon
Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228,236 (1942)).
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transaction costs and a decrease in value of the property right as a
means for promoting innovation; or (2) competitors will effectively
broaden the property right to increase certainty and avoid transaction
costs, effectively eliminating competition. When uncertainty in the
application of a legal standard exists, parties will either over-comply
or under-comply with the legal standard,
modifying their behavior
13 6
requires.
law
the
than
less
or
than
more
If uncertainty exists in the application of a legal standard, even
parties who normally would behave efficiently will face a greater
chance of being held liable because of the unpredictability. 137 The
only way that these parties can reduce that chance is by overcomplying with the legal rule.'38 Such behavior is inefficient as it will
contract industry output and raise prices. For example, if a patent
holder has a patent on a product with which a competitor would like
to compete and the enforceability of the patent is uncertain in scope,
the competitor would likely provide the patent holder with a larger
monopoly zone than the patent itself actually entitles. In effect the
zone of the patent holder's monopoly, the zone of no competition,
would expand beyond what was contemplated by society when the
patent was issued. In such a case, if the competitor elects to compete
at all with the patented product, it would do so in a less than optimal
fashion.
Neither scenario, where the patentee gets a substantially
diminished property right or where the patentee gets a substantially
expanded property right, will promote innovation.' 39 Both modify the
system of incentives that exists for securing the patent property right,
tipping the careful balance that has been struck between the patent
owner and the public, which ensures competition and tolerates
limited monopolies to promote innovation.
The impact of uncertainty in choice of venue is actually more
predictably one-sided in favor of the patent holder. In patent cases,

136. See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on
Compliance With Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. RaV. 965, 965-66 (1984) (concluding that
socially inefficient overcompliance or undercomplaince results from uncertain legal
standards even when the parties are risk neutral).
137. Id. at 966.
138. Id.
139. Contra Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without
Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive
Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 993-94 (1999) (arguing that constraints on the patentee's
monopoly caused by consistent under-compliance may be efficient as it enhances
competition).
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generally the patent holder selects venue. 140 Although there is usually
unpredictability in permitting choice from among the ninety-four
judicial districts, that unpredictability is greatly mitigated in a system
in which the choice belongs exclusively to the patent holder. In this
system, the defendant may not know which of the ninety-four districts
she will be sued in, but because she knows that the patent holder gets
to select the district, she can predict that the patent holder will choose
the forum most friendly to the patent holder. Hence, infringers will
systematically make ex ante product and design decisions in a manner
most favorable to the patent holder. The infringer will systematically
over-comply with the scope of the patent holder's exclusive right,
consistently expanding the property right beyond what was intended
when the patent was granted.
Of course, this analysis assumes one-dimensional decisionmaking by the patent holder and the infringer-defendant; namely,
that the defendant believes that the patent holder will always select
the district where it is most likely to win the case. As the empirical
results suggest, however, patent holders select particular judicial
districts for a variety of reasons, including speed of adjudication (e.g.,
Eastern District of Virginia) or chance of getting to trial (e.g., District
of Delaware), and not purely on win rate data.1 41 In short, the patent
holder's choice of venue is actually a multi-dimensional decision
blurring the infringer's ability to predict patent holder venue choices.
This uncertainty regarding the patent holder's choice of forum may
result in instances of both over- and under-compliance by the
competitor rather than only systemic over-compliance.
A trend in modem scholarship rejects the notion that
predictability and or certainty may actually be beneficial to the legal
system.'42 Some of this scholarship, termed Critical Legal Studies,
140. Although in some limited circumstances the infringer may be able to select venue
by bringing a declaratory judgment action, infra notes 32-35, a declaratory judgment
action can only be brought against the patent holder when the patent holder places the
infringer in reasonable apprehension of being sued. Hence, control in this circumstance
remains in the patent holder's hands. See supra notes 72-88 and accompanying text.
There is also the possibility that the infringer will be successful in getting a case
transferred under section 1404. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). This could
add some uncertainty to the calculus.
141. This assumes that patent holders are actually capable of determining which
judicial district would result in the highest chance of winning. The empirical evidence
presented in this article may actually assist in such outcome estimation.
142. See, e.g., Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 139, at 986-89 (arguing that "a regime
with some uncertainty and delay can produce this [monopoly] reward [for innovation]
more efficiently than a regime in which enforcement is instantaneous and certain"). The
work of Professors Ayres and Klemperer does not affect my analysis of the inefficiency
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suggests that "muddy" rules may be preferable for equitable reasons
of doing justice in particular cases. 143 As Frank Easterbrook
suggested, fairness is an ex post consideration second to the greater
productivity associated with the ex ante position, 144 which is
particularly true when the unpredictability is in a structural rule
rather than a substantive rule. The distinction that I draw is that
structural rules, like choice of venue, are rules that decide how a
range of future cases ought to be decided. This is not a substantive
rule that would be concerned with how a particular case ought to be
resolved. Uncertainty in a substantive rule, such as the doctrine of
equivalents or obviousness or the reasonableness standard for
negligence, may have value to Critical Legal Studies scholars as a
means for achieving justice on a case-by-case basis. Uncertainty
regarding structural rules, such as choice of venue, does not concern
justice between parties, but rather how or where a range of future
cases ought to be brought. Hence, predictability in choice of venue
rules would increase efficiency by reducing transaction costs and
maximizing the innovation incentive behind the patent system
without implicating the Critical Legal Studies concerns.
IV. PROPOSALS TO DECREASE FORUM SHOPPING

More research is needed on how to eliminate or decrease forum
shopping. In this Subpart, I sketch three possible mechanisms for
reducing forum shopping: achieving uniform application of the law
by the district courts, creating a specialized trial court to adjudicate
patent cases, and creating a more limiting venue statute.

caused by unpredictable choice of venue rules. First, Ayres and Klemperer focus on the
efficiency of Type I uncertainty (increasing the chance that valid patents will not be
enforced) rather than Type II uncertainty (increasing the chance that invalid patents will
be enforced). Id. at 987-88. The likely impact of uncertainty in venue choice, since the
choice rests predominantly with the patent holder, is over-compliance with the patent
holder's exclusive rights-Type II uncertainty. Moreover, Ayres and Klemperer's analysis
admits that delay and uncertainty can result in inefficiency, which undermines innovation
that must be counterbalanced by extending the patent term. Il at 1001. Increasing the
predictability of structural rules pertaining to venue actually will enhance competition
without the need to create a case-by-case basis approach to determine whether innovation
has been stifled too much, causing the need for specialized and administratively difficult
individualized patent term extensions.
143. See Rose, supra note 134, at 592-93 (stating that the Critical Legal Studies
movement believes that muddy rules promote fairness in decision making and citing
Duncan Kennedy, who "argues that hard-edged, crystal doctrines systematically abandon
people to the wiles of the bad and mean-spirited").
144. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court
and the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. REv. 4,11-12 (1984).
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The ideal mechanism for decreasing forum shopping and its
associated evils is to eliminate regional disparity in resolution means
and outcome. In short, the task is to eliminate variation in the ways
that the district courts resolve patent cases, which is likely impossible.
Even with the Federal Circuit dispensing binding substantive legal
pronouncements, district court outcomes vary procedurally and
substantively in ways that the appellate court cannot regulate. The
human element of the administration of justice cannot be eliminated
from the legal system.
It is unlikely that uniformity can be imposed in any meaningful
way upon the ninety-four district courts and 646 district court judges.
Therefore, the only way to eliminate forum shopping is to eliminate
the choice. So long as the parties and their advocates have unfettered
selection of forum, forum shopping will continue. There are two
possibilities for limiting forum shopping: limit forums or limit
shopping.
A.

Specialized Trial Court

A specialized trial court with exclusive jurisdiction over patent
cases could be formed. A specialized tribunal for adjudicating patent
cases would be beneficial for several reasons. First, it would
eliminate forum shopping entirely, as there would be no possible
alternative forum. Second, it would eliminate the inconsistency and
unpredictability in patent case resolution that currently exists because
of district court variations which would provide better guidance to
competitors for primary behavior. Third, a specialized tribunal would
develop expertise in patent law and the resolution of patent cases,
increasing its accuracy and efficiency at resolving these cases.14 5 At
the present, the ninety-four district courts with their 646 active district
court judges resolve approximately 2000 patent cases each year. As
these numbers indicate, individual district court judges are not seeing
a sufficient number of patent cases to allow them to develop expertise
in resolving these types of highly technical disputes. 46 A single,
145. The forum shopping that presently occurs actually helps to create a subset of
district courts with more specialization in patent disputes as plaintiffs consistently select a
group of district courts with great frequency. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying
text.
146. One caveat: as previously mentioned, many of the patent cases are consolidated
in a few select district courts. See supra Table I and accompanying text. Hence, the 2000
patent cases filed are not divided evenly among the district courts and the 646 judges.
Furthermore, senior judges can also preside over patent cases, increasing the pool of
potential adjudicators beyond 646. Finally, as previously mentioned, many of the 2000
patent cases filed actually settle early in the litigation process, see supra Figure 3 and

2001]

PA TENT FORUM SHOPPING

uniform trial forum would decrease patent litigation overall by
making the law and its application more predictable. This would
divert resources from wasteful transaction costs to more socially
productive research and development. Finally, the creation of a
specialized trial court with exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases
would decrease the clogged dockets of the district courts, removing
what are among the most complex cases on their dockets. Table 12
demonstrates that patent cases average only 0.57% of the annual civil
caseload in the district courts. These cases represent a much larger
percentage, 9.4%, of all civil cases, which required a trial of twenty or
more days. Although patent cases are not a large percentage of the
docket for a district court, they are among the most time consuming.

Table 12: Complexity of Patent Cases
Year

% of Civil Case Load

1983
1984

0.44
0.41

% of Cases Requiring 20+
Days of Trial
8.9
2.8

1985
1986

0.37
0.41

9.8
8.6

1987
1988
1989

0.43

11.4

0.47
0.53

11.2
8.2

1990
1991

0.52
0.52

13.1
9.5

1992
1993
1994
1995

0.57
0.65
0.66
0.66

13
8.7
10.4
7.8

1996
1997

0.68
0.73

6.3
6.5

1998
1999

0.78
0.80

13.9
8.9

As these statistics indicate, patent cases are more complex than
the mass of civil case filings. It is unlikely that many district court
accompanying text, and only about 100 each year are tried, meaning that very few district
court judges are actually gaining significant experience with these cases.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

judges would complain about taking patent cases off their dockets.'47
Although this alternative has many benefits, it is unlikely that
Congress will act in the immediate future to create such a specialized
court. Despite the widely perceived success of the Federal Circuit,
Congress is generally adverse to the notion of specialized courts. 14
Limiting Venue by Statute
The second way in which forum shopping could be minimized is
to eliminate choice, which could easily be accomplished by tightening
the patent venue requirements. 49 A more restrictive venue statute
would limit the forums in which the defendant could be sued to a
finite number based on defendant's residence and state of
incorporation (both of which are controllable by the defendant).
Such a limitation would reduce the plaintiff's ability to drag
defendants to an inconvenient forum, thereby increasing transactions
costs (at least for the defendant). It would also eliminate much of the
existing fighting over transfer motions. Such a proposal, however,
would disperse patent infringement filings throughout the judicial
districts. Though this would reduce the clogged dockets of the now
frequently targeted districts, it would also reduce the efficiency
created by the current consolidation of cases in a handful of districts.
As discussed above, repeatedly exposing judges to the same sorts of
claims undoubtedly causes some efficiency. 50 Under the present
unrestricted venue laws, a cluster of courts has evolved which deal
with the majority of patent suits. Some of this consolidation and its
ancillary efficiency may be lost by restricting venue.
Despite the potential loss of some efficiency in patent case
resolution resulting from the current consolidation of cases among a
few select districts, limiting venue would increase certainty and
B.

147. One district court judge described patent cases as follows: "Honest to God, I
don't see how you could try a patent matter to a jury. Goodness, I've gotten involved in a
few of these things. It's like somebody hit you between your eyes with a four-by-four. It's
factually so complicated." JudicialPanelDiscussionon Science and the Law, 25 CONN. L.
REV. 1127, 1145 (1993) (statement of Judge Covello, U.S. District Judge, District of
Connecticut).
148. See generally Randall R. Rader, Specialized Courts: The Legislative Response, 40

AM. U. L. REV. 1003 (1991) (suggesting that specialized courts have fallen out of favor
with Congress). Specialized courts have been criticized because of the potential for
"capture by the bar" and the elimination of percolation incident to not having a plethora
of courts simultaneously considering and deciding similar issues. See Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, The FederalCircuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1,
3-4 (1989) (discussing commentators' criticisms of specialized courts).
149. 28 U.S.C. § 1400 (1994 and Supp. IV 1998).
150. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
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predictability for the parties. Although such a proposal would in no
way reduce the inconsistency or lack of uniformity incident to having
multiple decision makers, it would increase predictability and provide
the public with better guidance for primary behavior in much the
same way a single specialized court would. By limiting the number of
jurisdictions where the defendant can be sued to a manageable
number, the defendant will be better equipped to decide at the outset
the boundaries of permissible behavior because it will be better able
to estimate the outcome of its actions. Presently, corporate infringers
may be sued in virtually any judicial district. Because of the
variations in district court resolution of patent cases, these potential
infringers are unable to predict to any degree of certainty the legal
consequences of their behavior. They are less able to estimate
outcome, which critically impacts their ability to control primary
behavior in a way that limits potential liability. This inability causes
the under- and over-compliance discussed above."'
One might argue that limiting jurisdiction to a small, finite
number of districts, such as two (state of incorporation or principle
place of business for example), 52 could actually increase uncertainty.
For example, suppose the two possible jurisdictions do not have legal
precedent on the legal standard at issue in the case or that the
precedent itself is uncertain. This system could create more
uncertainty than a system which gave the patent holder a choice of
ninety-four judicial districts because in such a system we can predict
that the patent holder would select a district in which the legal
standard at issue in the case is not only clear, but favorable. This
would provide more certainty to the competitor who is trying to make
legally rational business decisions ex ante. When, however, the
patent holder's venue choice is multi-dimensional-i.e., based upon a
variety of factors not just win rate data-the choice of ninety-four
districts creates more ex ante uncertainty.
Limiting venue would reduce forum shopping, but it would not
alleviate the variation that exists in district court resolution. This
proposal would increase certainty and predictability not by making
the law more uniform but by limiting the choice of where to enforce
patent rights. Hence, the same lack of confidence in the fair
administration of justice that currently results from the inconsistent

151. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
152. Of course, such a rule could have its own underlying fuzziness. For example, how
a judge determines where a company's principle place of business is located is not a bright
line rule.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

and unpredictable patent case adjudication in the district courts will
continue to exist.
This recommendation stems from the underlying purpose of the
venue statute, which has been gutted by current statutory
interpretations. Venue requirements were designed to be separate
and distinct from personal jurisdiction.153 The traditional purposes of
venue requirements include providing the litigants with a convenient
forum in which to resolve their dispute (protecting the defendant
from being forced to litigate in an inconvenient forum selected by the
plaintiff) and ultimately prohibiting plaintiffs from unrestrained
forum shopping.1 54
The systematic expansion of the patent venue statute through the
years has rendered it superfluous. 55 Because venue requirements
now devolve solely to an inquiry of whether requirements of personal
jurisdiction have been met, there is no effective venue statute. By
enacting a more limiting patent venue statute or interpreting the
existing patent venue statute as limited to place of incorporation and
principle place of business, much forum shopping could be
eliminated. Congress enacted a more limiting patent venue statute
intentionally, but now the patent venue statute is applied in the
identical manner as the general venue statute for corporate
defendants. 56 What then is the purpose of the separate and distinct
patent venue statute? Under the current legal interpretation, not
much.

157

If the statute were to limit the districts where a patent holder
could subject accused infringers to litigation, those infringers would
have better guidance for primary behavior. Eliminating some of the
incoherence in the application of the law and thereby increasing the
ability of the parties to estimate outcome will decrease litigation.
Limiting venue statutes based on convenience principles will also
eliminate the wasteful transaction costs associated with litigating
cases in a distant forum and reduce costly battles over forum
selection. 58 A modification of the patent venue statute to restore
153. See supra notes 10-19 (discussing traditional personal jurisdiction and venue
requirements).
154. See William C. Johnson, Note, The New Rule for Patent Venue for Corporate
Defendants: Kansas Was Never Like This, 11 PACE L. REv. 667, 669 (1991).
155. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.

156. See supra notes 14-27 and accompanying text.
157. The current regime is an abrogation of the canons of statutory construction, for
the current interpretation does not give full effect to the patent venue statute.
158. Of course, restoring some limiting effect to the separate patent venue statute
would apply only to infringement suits. Declaratory judgment actions brought by accused
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some significance to its separate existence could achieve this result
with minimal upheaval.
CONCLUSION

Forum shopping is alive and well in patent litigation. Borderless
commerce and lax jurisdiction and venue requirements give plaintiffs
in patent cases an unfettered choice of where to bring suit. This
Article uses empirical evidence to verify significant selection of
certain forums with associated regional variation in procedural and
substantive adjudication of patent cases. The data also substantiate
the impact of forum selection on win rate through direct comparison
among district courts with high concentrations of patent cases and by
analyzing the variation in win rate based upon who selected the
forum. A wide range of choices exists among available forums for
bringing suit, and the empirical evidence suggests that the choice
matters. Forum shopping may be more pervasive after this
publication, which documents the regional variation.
Even though patent holders have ninety-four districts in which to
bring suit, they consistently gravitate toward a cluster of districts.
Some theories explain why particular jurisdictions may be appealing.
For example, the Northern District of California has a high patent
holder win rate and is the locus of many high-tech industries, while
the Eastern District of Virginia affords the speediest justice in the
country. There are other popular jurisdictions such as Delaware and
Massachusetts whose popularity cannot be explained by the empirical
results. These districts have not been particularly favorable for the
patent holders and they do not provide expedient resolution, yet for
some reason their percentage of patent case filings far exceeds their
civil case averages generally. Accordingly, patent holders perceive
some benefit to certain forums, which cannot be substantiated or
explained by the empirical evidence.
infringers would fall under the general venue statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1994); see also
Charles S. Ryan, The Expansion of Patent Venue Under the Judicial Improvements and
Access to Justice Act, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 187,208 (1995) (noting that
declaratory judgment suits involving patents fall under the general venue statute rather
than the patent venue statute). Hence, declaratory judgment plaintiffs would have a
multitude of forum choices and the aggrieved patent holder would be much more limited.
Although this seems unsettling at first glance, it is actually the patent holder who dictates
when a potential infringer could bring suit. Declaratory judgment actions can be brought
only when the infringer has a reasonable apprehension of being sued (caused by some act
of the patent holder). Supra notes 29--33 and accompanying text. Hence, only the patent
holder's actions can give rise to a declaratory judgment action, thereby giving the patent
holder significant control over the forum.
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The success of the patent system for promoting innovation
hinges on the certainty and enforceability of patent rights.
Unpredictability in the system, which causes systematic overcompliance by competitors, is inefficient and robs the public of
competing products. The disproportionate consolidation of patent
cases in certain district courts suggests a preference by patent holders
for these courts. The empirical results presented herein demonstrate
significant outcome variation among these "preferred" forums,
indicating that there are likely several reasons why patent holders
gravitate towards them. Further research should consider why patent
holders select these forums and how the empirical results presented in
this Article might impact future forum selections. It would also be
useful to study exactly how transfer options impact outcome in patent
cases as a means of further examining the impact of forum selection
Although concrete
on procedural and substantive outcome.
explanation of forum selection is often elusive, the empirical results
presented offer a starting point.

